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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD DALE HARDY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Case No. 17062 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff-appellant, EDWARD DALE HARDY, appeals from 
an order in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, entered by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, 
granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 
with prejudice appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing in the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 3rd day of 
April, 1980, before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, on appel-
lant's application for Writ oi Habeas Corpus. and the appellant 
being sworn and testifying to the allegations of his petition, the 
court having !:eard his testimony and having received transcripts 
of appellant's plea and subsequent sentencing, and having reviewed 
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all exhibits submitted by the respective parties, and having con-
sidered respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and having con-
sidered arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the prem-
ises the court ordered that respondent's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment be granted and the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus be 
denied with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks an order granting his Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus, and in the alternative he seeks a reversal 
of the trial court's Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment which denied with prejudice appellant's Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
That on or about February 21, 1979, at approximately 
9:45 p.m., appellant, Edward Dale Hardy, with others, was present 
at the Crossroads Cafe in Davis County, State of Utah. Mr. 
Hardy's presence there was for the purpose of selling a given quan-
tity of marijuana to one Kirk Cordary and others with whom he 
made arrangements prior to, by telephone. 
There was conflict and disputes within the Davis County 
drug community arising from rip-offs and power struggles for con-
trol of the drug market in that County. Mr. Hardy was involved 
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in the foregoing and had been warned that certain individuals in 
the drug community were after him for his prior actions. 
On the night in question, Mr. Hardy had partaken a sub-
stantial quantity of traditional street drugs prior to and during 
the period arrangements were being made to sell the marijuana. Mr. 
Hardy and companion, one Kevin Gartrell, after arrangements were 
made, departed for the crossroads and enroute procured a shotgun 
for Mr. Hardy's protection. 
Upon arrival at the crossroads the parties made contract. 
An agreement was reached after a dispute over the price was re-
solved. Mr. Hardy and the deceased Kirk Cordary departed togeth-
er from the conference vehicle and were enroute to the Cordary ve-
hicle to procure the funds needed to consummate the deal, when a 
shotgun, carried by Mr. Hardy, discharged, fatally wounding Kirk 
Cordary. 
The drug deal was never consummated. Mr. Hardy fled 
from the scene with his companion. Mr. Hardy was subsequently 
arrested and charged for First Degree Murder in State of Utah v. 
Hardy, Second District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, Case No. 
3107-A. 
At the time of his arrest in the within matter he had one 
other criminal matter pending in Davis County. His life, other than 
the aforesaid, was relatively free from involvement with the courts, 
law enforcement, or the criminal system generally. 
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Following his incarceration, retention of counsel, and pre-
liminary hearing, Mr. Hardy escaped from the Davis County Jail 
with another inmate and was reported by local news people to 
have gone on a crime spree. He 'was subsequently apprehended 
and charged with several serious offenses allegedly arising from 
and during the escape flight from Davis County. 
He was arrested and incarcerated in the Salt Lake County 
Jail where he remained for six (6) weeks before being visited by 
his retained counsel in the within matter. After numerous delays, 
Mr. Hardy was returned to Davis County Jail. 
Mr. Hardy did travel to a local psychologist in Davis 
County for a trial conference prior to the entry of plea, however, 
the results of said evaluation were not made known to him by the 
evaluator or counsel. 
Mr. Hardy had few and brief conferences with counsel in 
preparation of trial in the within matter. Mr. Hardy was visited 
two (2) days prior to scheduled trial in the within matter and 
was informed that counsel was not prepared to go to trial on the 
scheduled date. Counsel further disclosed the plea negotiation a-
greement memorialized by the expiation agreement executed by Mr. 
Hardy. The degree of explanation of the meaning and import of 
the agreement did not expand on the detail set forth in the writ-
ing itself. Mr. Hardy was urged by counsel to accept the plea 
bargain as a means to avoid exposure to the imposition of the 
the death penalty. 
-4-
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Counsel for appellant at no time explained the function, 
role, and constitutional right to trial by jury. nor did Mr. Hardy 
know or understand the function a jury could have in determining 
the imposition of death penalty in his capital case. 
Mr. Hardy was not given a meaningful explanation by 
counsel nor did he understand his right to confront witnesses a-
gainst him and right against self-incrimination. On urging of coun-
sel and fear of the death penalty if he didn't agree to the negotia-
tion, he signed the expiation agreement and the record thereof is 
set before the court. 
After entry of sentence, he gave notice to the court of 
his dissatisfaction with counsel and the advice he had received 
from him. There was a subsequent hearing, September 20, 1979, 
regarding the guilty plea. The plea was not withdrawn, however, 
Mr. Hardy's complaint regarding counsel's assistance was made a 
part of the record. From the record page 32 of the transcript, Sep-
tember 20, 1979, inferentially, it was a foregone conclusion that 
the court would not impose the death penalty. 
Mr. Hardy was sentenced to life imprisonment and did not 
appeal the foregoing proceedings. The on record statement by 
counsel present was that he believed there was no merit for ap-
peal. 
Mr. Hardy subsequently commenced this proceeding by fil-
ing the within Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judi-
cial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. CB0-700. 
-5-
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The trial court granted respondent's Motion for Summaq 
Judgment denying appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Appellant appealed to the above-entitled court for relief sought in 
his petition or reversal of the trial court order· 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT INAPPROPRIATELY GRANTED RE-
SPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
WERE SHOWN AND RESPONDENT WAS NOT ENTI-
TLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Summary Judgment, Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Subsection (c), provides in pertinent part as follows: 
. The judgment sought shall be render-
ed forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
and answers to interrogatories and admis-
sions on file together with affidavits, if 
any show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law . . . 
This court has interpreted the meaning of the foregoing· 
subsection in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center Inc., 11 
U .2d 1, 354 P2d 559, ( 1960), and set down the well established 
standard by which other courts grant Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, to-wit: 
A Summary Judgment must be supported by 
evidence, · admission and inferences which, 
when viewed in the li ht most favorable to 
the oser, show t at t ere is no genuine is-
sue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law; such showing must preclude 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
all reasonable that the loser 
could, if 
which 
in is aver. 
The gist of the Motion for Summary Judgment is that 
the court must find from the pleadings, evidence, admissions 
and inferences viewed most favorably to the non-moving party 
there is no genuine issue of material fact precluding the non-
moving party from relief whatsoever, and that the prevailing 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Tanner 
v. Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-op, 11 U. 2d 353, 359 P. 2d 18 
( 1961 ), and Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 368 
p .2d 266, ( 1962). 
The appellant filed a Verified Complaint alleging in 
part he had been denied full disclosure by his trial counsel 
of certain facts and possible defenses in the within matter. 
That based on the information provided to appellant as is pro-
vided in the court record, appellant had not entered a knowing 
and voluntary plea of guilty to said capital offense. The rea-
sonable inference flowing from appellant's Complaint regarding 
counsel is averments of ineffectiveness of counsel. At the very 
least, the court transcript of September 20, 1979, page 32, 
page 12 of respondent's exhibit, appellant stated in pertinent 
part as follows: 
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I 'd like it known and have the court 
aware that I still believe that I was misrep-
resented and I was given bad advice. 
A review of the record reveals that there was no mean-
ingful discussion in the expiation agreement, or by the court 
in its proceedings of the appellant's constitutional right to 
trial and right to trial by jury. 
The right to jury trial in such a case is significant, 
as it relates to the burden .of proof on the State to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense 
for which appellant is charged. The court in its inquiry and 
the recitals in the expiation agreement failed to specifically de-
lineate the elements of the charge to which appellant was plead-
ing guilty, define the burden of proof the State would have as 
to each and every element thereof and the requirement that 
each and every juror. so find that the State had met that bur-
den. 
Furthermore, there was a failure to disclose the signi-
ficant role of the jury function in capital cases where the 
death penalty is imposed, to-wit: A separate and distinct hear-
ing requiring a unanimous finding on the issue of whether the 
imposition of the death penalty is appropriate under the circum-
stances of the instant case. 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There was a failure to disclose the automatic right of 
appeal to this court from judgments imposing the death penalty. 
All of the foregoing are facts that were not made 
known to the appellant that are significant considerations that 
should have been made known in the interest of justice to one 
considering a plea bargain under the threat of the imposition 
of the death penalty. 
It is submitted that based on the foregoing the trial 
court inappropriately granted respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The appellant pled he was not informed and the rec-
ord from the below court is devoid of meaningful disclosure of 
specific constitutional rights. There are genuine issues of mater-
ial fact and as a matter of law, respondent is not entitled to 
judgment. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE AP-
PELLANT DID NOT MAKE A KNOWING AND VOL-
UNTARY WAIVER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS WHICH IS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE 
TRIAL COURT TO ACCEPT HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
One cannot waive Constitutional Rights if one lacks ac-
tual kncwledge of the substantive meaning of those Constitution-
al Rights. The U.S. Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
tT.S. 238, 23 LEd.2d 274, 1969, .held that before a court may ac-
cept a guilty plea, there must be a knowing and voluntary 
waiver cf specific Federal Constitutional Rights. The court 
-9-
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stated the scope of the waiver as: 
Several Constitutional Rights are involved 
in the waiver that takes place when a plea 
of guilty is entered in a State criminal tri-
al. First, is the privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination guaranteed by the 
Fifth Amendment and applicable to the 
States by reason of the Fourteenth, Malloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U.S.1, 12 LEd.2d 653, 84 SCt. 
1489. Second, is the right to trial by jury, 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 20 
LEd. 2d 491, 888 SCt. 144. Third is the right 
to confront ones accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 
380 U.S. 400, 13 LEd. 2d 923, 85 SCt. 1065. 
We cannot presume a waiver of these import-
ant Federal Rights from a silent record. 
The issue of the effective waiver of Federal Constitu-
tional Rights in a State proceeding is governed by Federal 
standards, Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 14-13 LEd.2d 934, 
1965. 
ful 
ti on 
of 
The court in Boykin, ibid. , held that: 
A plea of guilty is more than admission of 
conduct, it is a conviction. Ignorance, un-
comprehension, coercion, terror, induce-
ments, subtle and blatant threats might be 
a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality. 
A 
APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY 
AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS 
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. 
In the case at bar appellant was not given a meaning-
explanation of his right to trial by jury. Both the expia-
agreement and the court record is devoid of any inquiry 
appellant's understanding of the purpose, function or role 
-10-
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of a jury trial. Likewise, the appellant had had little contact 
with the court system to give him independent knowledge from 
which he could reasonably rely to make an intelligent choice 
of action. The trial court at page 29 of Transcript of the Pro-
ceeings on August 15, 1979, made brief reference to the right 
to trial by jury issue in a profunctory fashion, failing to 
make any mention of appellant's right to trial by jury, to-wit: 
The court: Do you understand that this 
plea of guilty would take the 
place of a trial, and in fact 
there would be no trial, and 
you would be waiving your 
right to appeal? 
The court failed to mention the constitutional right to 
trial by jury, and it made no inquiry as to whether appellant 
knew or understood that if he was tried by a jury the verdict 
of guilty must be based on a unanimous finding that the State 
had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guil-
ty of each and every element of the offense for which the appel-
lant stood charged. 
Similarly, trial counsel in the expiation agreement at 
page 40, under the section entitled "YOU ARE NOW SPECIFICALLY 
ADVISED OF THE LAW: 
If you plead guilty there will not be a tri-
al of any kind, so that by pleading guilty 
you waive the right to trial by jury." 
-11-
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The record is devoid and appellant was not informed 
of the significant function the jury fulfills in capital cases· 
Section 76-3-206, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, pro-
vides: 
Capital felony-Death or life imprisonment.-
( 1) A person who has been convicted of a 
capital felony shall be sentenced in accord-
ance with section 76-3-207, and sentence 
shall be death or life imprisonment as the 
court of jury, in accordance with this sec-
tion shall determine. 
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence 
of death shall be subject to automatic re-
view by the Utah State Supreme Court within 
60 days after certification by the sentencing 
court of the entire record unless time is ex-
tended an additional period not to exceed 
30 days by the Utah State Supreme Court for 
good ca use shown. Such review by the Utah 
State Supreme Court shall have priority over 
all other cases and shall be heard in ac-
cordance with rules promulgated by the Utah 
State Supreme Court. 
Section 76-3-207 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Capital felony-Hearing on sentence.-( 1) When 
a defendant has been found guilty of a capi-
tal felony, there shall be further proceed-
ings before the court or jury on the issue 
of penalty. The proceedings shall be conduct-
ed before the court or jury which found the 
defendant guilty In these proceed-
ings, evidence may be presented as to any 
· matter the court. deems relevant to sentence, 
including but net limited to the nature and 
circumstances of the crime, the defendant's 
character, background, history, mental and 
physical condition, and any other facts in 
aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. 
The state's attorney and the defend-
ant shall be permitted to present argument 
for or against sentence of death. . . . Miti-
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gating circumstances shall include the follow-
ing: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history 
of prior criminal activity; 
. . ( d) At the time of the murder, the ca-
pacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirement 
of law w.1s substantially impaired as a re-
sult of mental disease, intoxication, or influ-
ence of drugs; 
(2). In all proceedings before a jury, 
under th is section, it s ha 11 be instructed 
as to the punishment to be imposed upon a 
unanimous verdict for death and that to be 
imposed if a unanimous verdict for death is 
not found. • If the jury is unable to 
reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sen-
tence of death, the court shall discharge 
the jury and impose the sentence of life im-
prisonment. 
In addition, the waiver of a jury trial in a capital 
case constitutes a double waiver of Constitutional Rights, to-
wit: Right to tria 1 by jury and right to an automatic appeal 
in the event the dertth sentence is imposed. This factor was not 
disclo~ed to the app~llant. 
The role ·"if the jury in capital cases is a material 
consideration that ri1Ust be weighed by one charged with a capi-
tal offense before he can intelligently waive his right to trial 
by jury. Subtle coercion was recognized by Justice Douglas, in 
Boykin, ibtd., .3.S a possible cover-up for unconstitutionality. 
The languag,~ f:-c1!11 the expiation agreement pertaining to the 
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reason for the change of plea smacks of such coercion, to-wit: 
and that you are pleading guilty to 
this to avoid the exposure to the death pen-
alty. 
The diss-ent in the United States Supreme Court case 
of United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 20 LEd.2d 138, 1968, 
recognized that: 
Pleas of guilty and waivers of jury should 
be carefully examined before they are accept-
ed in order to make sure that they have 
been neither coerced nor encouraged by the 
death penalty power in the jury. 
In the instant capital case, the role of the jury in 
effecting the death penalty is not shown to have been explain-
ed to appellant, and yet trial counsel recommended appellant 
change his plea to guilty to insure avoidance of the imposition 
of the death penalty. The common understanding and import 
from the language of the expiation agreement is that appellant 
exposes himself to the death penalty by invoking his Constitu-
tional Right to Trial By Jury. The true import of the jury im-
pact in the capital case has been set forth by statute above. 
It is submitted that the appellant was coerced into 
changing his plea because he believed a jury trial would mean 
his execution. 
It is further submitted that from the record, no mean-
ingful disclosure of appellant's Constitutional Rights to jury 
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trial was given and therefore no knowing and voluntary waiv-
er of said Constitutional Rights to Trial By Jury was effected. 
B 
APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWL INGLY 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION. 
The court record of August 15, 1979, fails to make 
any reference or inquiry into appellant's understanding of his 
right not to be a witness against himself. Furthermore, the ex-
piation agreement, at page 40, sets forth the following conclu-
sionary assertion: 
You have the right . 
ination ''If 
waive these rights". 
against self incrim-
you plead guilty, you 
Appellant's knowledge of the nature of the offense for 
which he stood charged, his presumption of innocence; and the 
burden of proof on the State, was not shown in the record. The 
record does not show appellant knew the nature of the offense 
for which he was pleading guilty. More specifically, what the 
State had a burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt in 
the event the Constitutional Right to Trial By Jury was invok-
ed. 
Appellant was charged with First Degree Murder, a vio-
lation of Section 76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amend-
ed, which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Murder in the first degree-( 1) Criminal homi-
cide constitutes murder in the first degree 
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of 
in 
as 
or 
if the actor intentionally or knowingly caus-
es the death of another under any of the 
following circumstances: 
. ( d) the homicide was committed while 
the actor was engaged in the commission of, 
. aggravated robbery . . .. 
(2) Murder in the first degree in a capital 
offense. 
The court made only cursory inquiry into the 
knowingly and intentionally committed the act that 
the homicide, and the court failed to make inquiry 
a proposition that the homicide was committed while 
was engaged in the commission of an aggravated 
elements 
resulted 
or state 
the act-
robbery. 
The nature of the offense charge would require the State to 
prove the respective elements of the aggravated robbery beyond 
a reasonable doubt in order for the appellant to be convicted 
of the offense of First Degree Murder as charged. 
The expiation agreement did not assist the court in 
disclosing the nature of the offense for which appellant was 
charged. The last paragraph of said agreement, page 40, set 
forth the following: 
By your signing, you are acknowledging to 
me that you did in fact shoot and kill Kirk 
Cordary . . . 
The foregoing purported admission could relate to any homicide 
from Justifiable Homicide to the offense of First Degree Murder 
and fall substantially short of making certain on the record, 
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that appellant knew the nature of the offense to which he was 
pleading guilty. 
It is encumbant on the State to prove each of the fore-
going elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Section 76-1-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amend-
ed, provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Presumption of innocence-"Element of the of-
fense" defined.-( 1) A defendant in a crimi-
nal proceeding is presumed to be innocent 
until each element of the offense charged a-
gainst him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defen-
dant shall be acquitted. 
( 2) As used in this part the words "element 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, 
or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, 
or forbidden in the definition of the of-
fense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required . 
The cor<?llary to the foregoing_ rule of law is Section 
77-31-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which pro-
vides as follows: 
Defendant presumed innocent-Reasonable doubt-
A defendant in a criminal action is presum-
ed to be innocent until the contrary is prov-
ed, and in case of a reasonable doubt 
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal. 
It is submitted that the court record is devoid of any 
specific or meaningful inquiry into appellant's Constitutional 
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Right against compulsory self-incrimination and pursuant to the 
requirements and learning from Boykin, ibid., the guilty plea 
entered by appellant entered herein was therefore not knowing-
ly and voluntarily made. 
c 
APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY 
AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CON-
FRONT HIS ACCUSORS. 
The Court Transcript of proceedings on August 15, 
1979, is devoid of any mention ·of appellant's Sixth Amendment 
rights to confront the witnesses against him. The court did not 
make specific inquiry as to that right, its waiver, or appel-
lant 's understanding of the Constitutional Right. 
The expiation agreement at page 40, makes reference 
to said Constitutional Right as follows: 
You have the right to be confronted by the 
witnesses against you if you plead 
guilty, you waive these rights. 
It is doubtful, and there is no showing that appellant 
had substantive understanding of what· was afforded the accus-
ed by the Constitutional Right and just how he would exercise 
said right. As to either of the foregoing inquiries, the court 
r.ecord is devoid of any meaningful showing that appellant did. 
in fact waive his Constitutional Right to confront witnesses a-
gainst him. 
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D 
THE ADEQUACY OF THE COURT RE-
CORD TO DETERMINE THE APPRO-
p RIA TENESS OF A ST A TE COURT 'S 
ACCEPTANCE OF A GUILTY PLEA 
IS CONTROLLED BY FEDERAL 
STANDARDS. 
The waiver of Federal Constitutional Rights are govern-
ed by Federal standards; see Douglas v. Alabama, ibid; no 
waiver can be presumed from a silent record, see Boykin, ibid.; 
reasonable adherence to Federal mandates must be clear from 
the record to sustain attack for inadequacy, see Garner v. 
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173, 7 LEd.2d 207 (1961). 
The court record in the instant case, considered in its 
entirety, fails to comply with the Federal standard as set forth 
in Boykin, ibid., i.e., it is devoid of sufficient inquiry by the 
court or counsel to ascertain whether appellant when entering 
his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights 
under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. 
POINT I II 
APPELLANT'S APPROPRIATE REMEDY IS A WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
The extraordinary remedy of Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
Rule 65B(f), et sec, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
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( i) any person imprisoned in the peneten-
tiary or county jail under commitment of 
any court, whether such imprisonment be un-
. der an original commitment or under a com-
mitment for violation of probation or parole, 
who asserts that any proceedings which re-
sulted in his commitment that was a sub-
stantial denial of liis rights under the con-
stitution of the Unted States or the State of 
Utah or both ma institute proceedin s on 
this rule. Emphasis added. 
The foregoing language is absent of any condition pre-
cedent of a requirement the issues raised pursuant to said 
rule requires that a direct appeal be exhausted before one seek 
remedies thereunder. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
is properly invoked when the court has no jurisdiction over the 
person or the offense, or the requirements of law have been so 
disregarded that the party is substantially and effectively de-
nied due process of law, or where some such fact is shown that 
it would be unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction. 
Bryant v. Turner, 19 U. 2d 284, 431 P. 2d 121, 1967, Helmuth v. 
Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (1979), Gentry v. Smith, 600 P.2d 1008 
( 1979). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this position in the 
cases of Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700 (1979), Chess v. Smith, 
1617 P.2d 341, 343 (1980). 
Appellant in the instant case, has been substantially 
and effectively denied due process of law as a result of the 
trial court proceedings. The appellant was denied effective as-
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sistance of counsel at the time of sentencing. At the foregoing 
hearing he raised objections as to the effectiveness of counsel. 
the sufficiency of the advice given to him, and questioned the 
legitimacy of. the proceedings. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
the court declined to provide substitute counsel to assist appel-
lant in the proceeding, and received and made no comment on 
counsel's pre-sentence comment concerning appellant's right to 
appeal and the lack of merits thereof. 
The resulting effect was to cause appellant not to file 
a timely appeal and the comments and failure of the court to 
act at the time the objections were raised actually caused preju-
dice and the resulting Constitutional violations. 
Based on the, foregoing, the appellant complied with 
the Utah Contemporaneous Objection Rule (See Rule 4, Utah 
Rules of Evidence and Rule 46, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), 
thereby complying with the widely accepted Wainright v. Sykes 
doctrine, Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
It is submitted that upon review the court should find 
that the proceedings rose to the level of fundamental unfairness 
and did substantially prejudice and deny appellant his Constitu-
tional Rights, and therefore, appellant should be allowed to 
remedy said issues by way of Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, appellant submits that there 
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are genuine issues of fact, that respondent is not entitled to 
a Judgment as a matter of law, that appellant did not knowing-
ly and voluntarily waive his Constitutional Rights under the 
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution, and that as a result of the trial proceedings, def en-
dant was substantially denied due process of law and as a re-
sult thereof, appellant should be granted his Writ of Habeas 
Corpus or this matter should be remanded to the trial court for 
an evidentiary hearing. 
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